Abstract: This paper critically examines and explains the increasingly influential idea of 'global governance'. After outlining the evolving intentional order and the new actors that are prominent part of contemporary governance structures, I assess the implication of these developments for the state.
Introduction
At a time when most of the world is being affected by a variety of political, economic and social processes subsumed under the rubric of globalization, it is unsurprising that patterns of governance would be similarly transformed. If globalisation is understood as 'a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions… generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (Held et al 1999: 16) , and if governance is understood as 'all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage societies' (Kooiman: 1993: 2), then it was almost inevitable that these concepts would come together in an effort to describe the way the contemporary international system functions. The key point that distinguishes global governance, as opposed to the traditional national form, is that the purposive component of governance that Kooiman rightly highlights has much more complex, increasingly transnational origins than ever before.
To understand the transformation that has occurred in the way systems of rule and authority operate, the way broadly domestic and international processes interact, and the vast array of new actors that are influencing or attempting to influence political and economic issues in the contemporary international order, we need to explore the way the international system has developed over the last fifty years or so. Consequently, I initially sketch some of the key changes that have occurred in the post-World War II global political economy, before considering the role played by the numerous non-state actors that have become such a prominent part in emerging patterns of global governance. While the picture that emerges is complex, and despite the fact that our conceptualisations of the processes involved remain incomplete and theoretically contested, there is no doubt that the way many of the most important social, political and economic processes are developing is of a different qualitative order than has existed for the preceding four of five hundred years. In short, at both a thoeretical and practical level the idea that we live in a world that is shaped exclusively or even primarily by the actions of nation states is no longer supportable and we need new ways of thinking about the way the world works. Global governance offers one way of beginning to think about such issues.
The Evolving International Order
Although there is an important debate about the extent and historical origins of processes associated with globalisation, what we can say is that many of the economic, political and even social processes associated with this idea are of a qualitatively different order at the present time. Although some of these issues are dealt with elsewhere in this volume, it is worth briefly highlighting a number of these changes as they to explain why new patterns of governance may have been to some extent a 'functional' necessity. Put differently, some scholars have persuasively argued that given an increasingly integrated economic system that transcends national borders and political jurisdictions, a degree of transnational cooperation is an inescapable prerequisite for international commerce to operate effectively and securely (Cerny 1995) .
Many of these changes are well known and can be simply noted. The rise of transnational corporations, the remarkable growth of international financial markets and the vastly expanded flows of foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment these developments have generated, have not simply reconfigured the international economic order, they have also profoundly affected individual states. This transformation is highlighted firstly, by the fact that some private sector companies are now larger economic actors than many individual national economies and secondly, by the disjuncture between the scale of capital flows and national economies. What is equally important to recognise is that this situation, in which private sector driven forces have assumed a more prominent role in managing aspects of the global economy, and in which states are arguably in relative retreat (Strange 1996) , has come about as a consequence of specific set of geopolitical circumstances.
The pivotal moment in the emergence of new patterns of global governance occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War under the auspices of U.S hegemony. While the detail of this process is considered elsewhere, the important point to stress is that under American leadership a new international order was systematically and intentionally created. As far as emergent processes of global governance are concerned a couple of points are especially significant. First, it was an order that promoted a form of liberal, free market-oriented economic activity that would ultimately colonise most of the world, and which was designed to encourage greater openness and economic integration. Second, to facilitate and regulate greater economic integration, a number of new intergovernmental organisations were established to help manage the new international order. The so-called Bretton Woods institutions -the World Bank, the IMF, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (later to be replaced by the WTO), represented a new and decisive step on the road to global governance.
The creation of such organisations and the steady evolution of an array of other intergovernmental, quasi-state and private sector organisations has led -in Western Europe, at least -to the consolidation of 'thick' institutional infrastructure that has actually facilitated and permitted new patterns of transnational governance (Amin and Thrift 1994) . In many ways, however, the rapid development of cross border political cooperation and institutional coordination that characterises development within Western Europe, and the 'pooling' of national sovereignty that is so characteristic of the European Union (EU), is the exception that proves the rule: in other parts of the world like East Asia, the state remains a much more central player, the private sector is less developed and independent, and national sovereignty is still jealously guarded (Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998) . At the outset, therefore, we need to guard against sweeping generalisations about the contemporary 'global' order and recognise that there are important variations in patterns of governance within it.
A couple of further points ought to be emphasised in this regard. First, some states are far more powerful than others, and have a concomitantly greater capacity to influence the way the international system operates. Indeed, European states pioneered a form of global governance during their colonisation of much of the planet in the nineteenth century, a process that paved the way for more recent patterns of interaction and which helps to explain the different styles and capacities with which countries respond to the ubiquitous challenges of globalisation (Hobsbawm 1987) . These earlier experiences also serve as a reminder that contemporary forms of governance and globalisation are not entirely novel or unprecedented. However, the second point to stress is that the intensification, depth and complexity of transnational relationships, and the increasingly prominent role on non-state actors means that we inhabit a qualitatively different international order. The international system that emerged in the post-war period highlighted the evermore apparent reality that states were no longer the sole or necessarily always the most important regulators of international economic activity, and that they would increasingly share authority and responsibility with new actors in the international system.
Theorising global governance
Before looking at how these new processes of global governance work in practice, it is worth considering how the emerging order has been seen theoretically. A number of prominent scholars have made significant contributions to our understanding of the changing international order, none more so than James Rosenau. In a path-breaking essay written in the early 1990s Rosenau outlined his conception of 'governance without government', or the persistence of an international order that is not solely dependent on the activities of national governments. For Rosenau, global order consisted of three interconnected levels of activity: ideational, behavioural and political.
The ideational level, as the name suggests, is concerned with the way people intersubjectively perceive the order of which they are a part. The ruling ideas or the dominant values of an era are critical in this regard, as is the capacity to define and produce them in ways that 'naturalise' a particular political and economic order. This is why some Marxist scholars are so concerned with the ideational or ideological aspects of cultural imperialism and hegemony, and the capacity for the leading state and non-state actors to manufacture the conventional wisdom or common sense of the day (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) . Marxists and critical theorists are not the only ones interested in the role of ideas and their influence on patterns of governance, however. Oran Young, for example, has also made a major contribution to our understanding of the way governance works. Young, focuses on the particular 'regimes' that inform actor behaviour in specific issue areas. For Young (1999: 5) , regimes are 'sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and/or programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and govern their interaction'. In this context, regimes are a potentially useful way of capturing the 'horizontal' patterns of governance and authority that characterise the management of issues which are not driven in a 'top-down' fashion, but which involve a range of new actors and forces.
The second aspect of Rosenau's schema is the behavioural or objective level -or, more simply, the routinised patterns of activity that are the conscious or unconscious expressions of inter-subjective understandings. Market-oriented behaviour is, perhaps, the most important example of recurrent activities that are not 'natural', but the pervasive product of particular historical and even geopolitical circumstances. It is no coincidence that Rosenau and other scholars became preoccupied with questions of global governance in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when major alternatives to the geographic expansion and ideological dominance of capitalism were decisively eclipsed. The third level of Rosenau's model of global order brings us back to the creation of the post-war order that played such a large part in liberal capitalism's ascension and the prominent role played by the 'formal and organised dimension of the prevailing order' (Rosenau 1992: 15) . In addition to the Bretton Woods institutions, Rosenau also recognises the importance -especially during the Cold War period -of security organisations like NATO in encouraging particular forms of behaviour at both the individual and inter-state levels, as well as in consolidating a dominant ideological perspective.
More recently, Rosenau has drawn attention to the way responsibility for key decision-making processes has shifted away from the traditional political realm of the nation state, to new actors in the economic and social realms. Such processes have, he claims, been driven by the ending of the Cold War, the pursuit of more representative forms of political organisation, the capacity skilled individuals have to access political processes, and by the global interconnectedness of issues as diverse as the environment, AIDS, and economic regulation that necessarily transcend national borders (Rosenau 1995) . Importantly, in a number of critical issue areas authority for policy formulation and regulatory responsibility has passed from national governments to non-state actors (Rosenau 1990) . To see why this is potentially important, it is necessary to spell out how the system has changed and who the new players are.
Structure and Agency in Global Governance
One way of thinking about governance and the factors that distinguish it under conditions of globalisation is to consider the levels at which it occurs. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who were amongst the first people to draw attention to the increasing degree of 'interdependence' that characterised the international system in the post-war period (Keohane and Nye 1977), have recently suggested that contemporary patterns of governance occur at three different, relatively distinct levels (Keohane and Nye 2000). In an historical context, the most novel level is the supranational, which is compromised of transnational corporations, intergovernmental organisations like the WTO, the IMF and United Nations. 'Below' this is the familiar realm of the nation state, and nationally-based firms and organisations.
At a yet 'lower' level are local governments, firms and actors that do not have a national presence. The complex, multi-dimensional interaction between these different levels provides a form of governance, or 'the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group' (Keohane and Nye 2000: 12).
One of the 'groups' to have attracted most attention of late, and one that operates at all three levels of Keohane and Nye's schema, is the non-governmental organization (NGO). These institutions are analysed in more detail elsewhere in this volume, but given that some observers believe international non-government organizations (INGOs) are helping to redefine the way patterns of global governance occur (Slaughter 1997) , it is important to highlight briefly a number of their most salient aspects. The most striking feature of INGOs is their remarkable growth: INGOs have increased from about 800 in 1900, to over 4,000 by 1980, leading some observers to see them as an inevitable corollary of the expansion of both the world economy and the inter-state system, and a key element in the emergence of a 'world culture' (Boli and Thomas 1999) . Certainly, non-state actors like INGOs have become much more visible and integral parts of the international system, but it is also important to recognise that many of these organisations are small, unable to influence events in any direct way, and may not necessarily support 'progressive' causes (Morris-Suzuki 2000). Greenpeace may be an INGO, but so are a number of right-wing, reactionary and racist political organisations. In other words, we can't assume anything about the nature of causes an INGO might support, or about its capacity to influence events.
It is important to keep these caveats in mind when considering the growth of 'global civil society', which a number of authors assume is both inevitable and desirable. Lipshutz (1992) , for example, argues that the rise of global civil society is an inevitable corollary to the apparent decline of the state and a site for the creation of a counter-hegemonic discourse that may challenge the dominance of consumer capitalism. Similarly, in one of the most comprehensive analyses of global civil society yet undertaken, John Keane (2003) is equally enthusiastic about its prospects, and sees it both as a mechanism for the inculcation of peaceful values and as a central component of a new form of 'cosmocracy'. The cosmocracy -'a conglomeration of interlocking and over-lapping sub-state, state and suprastate institutions and multidimensional processes that interact, and have political and social effects, on a global scale' (Keane 2003: 98) -is broadly similar to Keohane's and Nye's model. What is distinctive about Keane's position is his positive view about the relationship between business and civil society. For Keane, the distinction between the market and civil society is 'artificial', as capitalism effectively structures society. Moreover, business has a functional need for an effectively functioning civil society. In other words, it is in the interests of capitalists to encourage the development of civil society.
Business interests and global governance
While this view of the business-societal relationship might seem somewhat Panglossian, it does acknowledge one pervasive aspect of contemporary patterns of governance: business interests are influential actors in processes of global governance and have assumed an increasingly prominent functional role in shaping critical regulatory outcomes in areas formerly managed by states. What is less often recognised is just how pervasive and integral to new patterns of governance business interests have become. John Braithwaite's and Peter Drahos's (2000) landmark study of global business regulation has detailed just how extensive and influential the private sector now is. In many of the most important areas of transnational commercial activity and regulation -property, trade, telecommunications, food, transportation and the financial sector -'experts' from the private sector have frequently played prominent roles in shaping the regulatory frameworks that govern particular issue areas. Self-regulation by industry, in which the representatives of key businesses and industries develop regulatory regimes and then 'model' appropriate practice through the inculcation of particular norms, is at the heart of the new style of governance in which the private sector plays such a prominent part.
There are a number of examples of important industries where governments have allowed markets and the private sector institutions that inform and mange them to make the regulatory running at the cost of governmental authority. One of the most important industries in this regard is the international financial sector which has expanded dramatically since the early 1970s and which has the capacity to profoundly influence the autonomy and position of individual governments and the economies they attempt to manage. The regulation of securities markets, for example, is something that is managed primarily by unelected actors from the private sector (Underhill 1995) . Equally significant, the credit ratings agencies that play such a crucial role in providing market participants with information are similarly independent of governments and have an increasing capacity to make judgements that directly influence capital and interest rate movements (Sinclair 2001 ) -judgements that inevitably constrain the degree of policy autonomy available to individual governments, especially those outside to core economies of Europe, Japan and North America.
A more subtle, but highly significant and influential example of the shift to nongovernmental modes of regulation can be seen in the increased prominence and independence of central banks. Across most of the OECD countries, central bankers have been given a greater degree of policy-making independence, frequently assuming sole responsibility for interest rate policy. More importantly as far as issues of global governance are concerned, the fashion for granting greater policy independence to central bankers has been consolidated and expanded through the auspices of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), a forum in which central bankers from the G 10 countries help to set the regulatory framework for domestic banking sectors. Although some authors have rightly stressed continuing differences in national banking sectors (Kapstein 1994) , as Susan Strange (1998: 176) points out 'financial innovation, liberalisation, and sharpened competition between banks and other private enterprises' have steadily eroded the capacity for national governments to independently regulate 'domestic' firms and practices. Indeed, the very nature of the technological and competitive innovations associated with the information economy that the global financial sector epitomises has led some observers to conclude that the era of the national economy and the capacity for discrete national patterns of regulation is definitively over (Korbin 2002) .
States and Global Governance
It might be supposed from the increased importance of private sector and intergovernmental agencies in the new global governance that the nation-state is in permanent decline. This view is supported by those authors who draw attention to more generalised features of globalisation, in which states are apparently competing with each other to create 'business friendly' regulatory environments in the hope of attracting inflows of investment, especially the 'direct' variety associated with job creation. Philip Cerny (1996) , for example, describes the underlying dynamic of this competitive international environment as 'regulatory arbitrage', and argues that individual governments are complicit in undermining both their own autonomy and the general regulatory standards that govern economic activity across the world.
Wolfgang Reinicke (1998) is more sanguine about the impact of globalisation on the capacity of individual state's to govern, and argues that they can respond proactively to such challenges through 'cooperative competition'. In this formulation, states maintain substantial sovereignty relative to each other through coordinated policy responses to changes associated with the evolution of the global economy. The growth of intergovernmental organisations like the EU, and to a lesser extent NAFTA and the Asia Pacific Cooperation (APEC) forum illustrate how such cooperative strategies might be institutionalised. Significantly, however, Reinicke (1998: 61) acknowledges that under conditions of cooperative competition governments 'do not necessarily represent the general public interest'. In other words, even if individual states can retain a degree of authority and autonomy by embracing cooperative strategies and coordinating policy with other states, the overall rationality or guiding principles that inform their actions may have more to do with narrowly conceived business interests than they do with the individual polities they claim to represent.
The anti-democratic potential of governance by unelected officials in key intergovernmental agencies like the IMF or the host of lower-profile but influential organisations that govern many areas of transnational economic activity has long been recognised. This anti-democratic potential has implications that extend far beyond the liberal democracies of the core economies. As David Held (1995) points out, there is 'a striking paradox to note about the contemporary era: from Africa to Eastern Europe, Asia to Latin America, more and more nations and groups are championing the idea of "the rule of the people"; but they are doing so at just the moment when the very efficacy of democracy as a national form of political organization appears open to question. As substantial areas of human activity are progressively organised on a global level, the fate of democracy, and of the independent democratic nation-state in particular is fraught with difficulty' (Held 1995: 21) .
One of the biggest potential challenges to the idea of globalisation in particular and to global governance more generally is that existent patterns of rule, authority, and order are seen to systematically favour the developed world at the expanse of the developing nations (Higgott 2000) . As Reinicke (1998: 227) points out, if processes associated with globalisation are to be sustained, if global public policy is to become more reality than rhetoric, 'the governments of developing countries will have to participate in it'. Yet despite the diffusion of authority to a range of new actors, and despite the apparent diminution of the power of states generally, even 'global' patterns of governance exhibit some familiar, hierarchically structured patterns of power that do not bode well for meaningful democratic representation or the effective inclusion of new players.
The more things change...?
To understand this apparent paradox, we need to revisit Braithwaite's and Drahos's exploration of global business regulation, for as they point out, even 'in the era of information capitalism and the new regulatory state, control from the nation's territory of abstract objects like patents is crucial to building the nation's wealth, as is embedding global principles of regulation that suit the wealth-creators from that state's territory. The resilience of US power that many expected to wane in the 1990s can be understood in terms of the masterful work of the Clinton administration in these areas' (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 475) .
This might seem a somewhat surprising observation at a time when US HEGEMONY has assumed a more unilateral and militaristic style under the administration of George W. Bush, but it is, nevertheless, one that captures something important about evolving patterns of governance. The capacity to shape the ruling ideas and regulatory architecture, the ability to assert influence through nominally independent intergovernmental agencies like the IMF (Pauly 1997) , and the possibility that private sector organisations may continue to reflect the perspectives of businesses from specific countries, all entrench the interests of particular countries and groups. While some might prefer to describe the way this more diffuse, multi-level form of power operates in terms of an evolving transnational class that transcends narrowly defied national borders (Robinson and Harris 2000) , the salient point is that it is still possible to detect the clear influence of national forces and interests in the way major regulatory processes develop. For example, recent changes in the regulation of patents and copyright, highlighted by the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreements, reflect both the growing importance of the service sector in the American economy, and the capacity of American-based business to influence the US government to place TRIPS on the intentional policy-making agenda (Sell 2000) .
It is the persistence of patterns of order that bear the continuing imprint of American power in particular and of 'Western' interests more generally that has led some authors to conclude that -at best -we are witnessing the emergence of a 'global state' that entrenches and builds upon the institutional order created at Bretton Woods in the wake of World War II (Shaw 2000) , or -at worst -the pursuit of 'world dominance' by the US and economic interests associated with it (Gowan 1999) . At the very least we can say that the post-war institutional order associated with US hegemony has actively promoted a form of neoliberalism and the Washington consensus that has suited the collective interests of the developed industrial economies more than it has the developing world. From a governance perspective it is also worth noting that some of the key agencies of the international order that the US continues to dominate, such as the World Bank, have been enthusiastic promoters of a particular form of governance and development policies in the non-core countries. 'Good governance', or a policy framework broadly in sympathy with the Washington Consensus, has been at the heart of a reformist template that is in keeping with the consolidation of a liberal international order in which nominally independent inter-governmental organisations are critical agents of change, sources of advice, and mediators of global pressures (Leftwich 2000) .
In short, while there may be an increasingly diverse array of agencies, actors and organisations operating under the broad rubric of global governance, and while there is clearly something novel about the way some issues are managed, regulated and organised, there is also something familiar about both the major players that influence crucial political and economic outcomes, and the underlying forces that motivate them. In such circumstances it may be wise to consider global governance, as Craig Murphy (2000: 799) does, as 'more a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge are taking place'. As such, it is not as novel as some accounts would have us believe.
Implications and prospects
Global governance, then, is a rather paradoxical animal. On the one hand, the concept of global governance draws our attention to a whole range of new players that either previously did not exist, or existed in such small numbers as to have little presence or impact on patterns of governance. On the other hand, however, we should not confuse novelty and noise for an ability to actually determine political and economic outcomes. One of the most striking features of contemporary patterns of governance is that for all the attention rightly given to the new players, some of the older, more familiar actors remain important. States generally, and the US in particular, still play a central role in underwriting and signing-off on the regulatory frameworks that govern transnational activities -even if the impetus for, and content of, such agreements increasingly emerges from unelected private sector organisations or intergovernmental agencies.
The other familiar face of global governance is its underlying rationality: many writers have drawn attention to the functional necessity for forms of governance that transcend national borders and which provide a degree of certainty for the transnational economic relationships and modes of cross-border integration that have been such central drivers of processes associated with globalisation. This is not to suggest that global governance is simply an inevitable epiphenomenon of underlying economic reality. Rather it is to acknowledge that imperatives associated with an increasingly global form of free market capitalism provide a powerful force for regulatory harmonisation and cooperation.
More troublingly, however, the discourse of global governance, especially when promulgated by powerful business forums and inter-governmental agencies dominated by 'the West', implicitly and sometimes explicitly encourages the idea that effective governance depends upon a particular sort of regulatory architecture, concomitant political practices and economic structures, and a preparedness and capacity to adopt specific sorts of ideas and values (Latham 1999) . Whether the increasingly prominent social movements that some authors have identified as part of the 'new multilateralism' will prove capable of challenging the ruling ideas of the era and establishing a counter hegemonic discourse remains to be seen (see O'Brien et al 2000) .
What is clear is that the emergence of global governance poses a major theoretical challenge for traditional, state-centric analyses of international relations. Certainly states remain critically important and powerful actors in the international system, but they are cooperating with each other, and with a range of new actors in ways that are simply not explicable by examining the actions of states in isolation. It is not simply that some states have never enjoyed the sort of sovereignty routinely and uncritically referred to in much of the International Relations literature (Beeson 2003) , but even the most powerful of states are asserting themselves in new ways, and may in fact be consolidating their positions and influence by utilising the supposedly independent institutions of global governance. Global governance, in other words, is a useful shorthand for the new regulatory order, but one that needs careful handling and critical interrogation.
